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Abstract 
This paper presents a general equilibrium model in which nominal government debt pays an 
inflation risk premium. The model predicts that the inflation risk premium will be higher in 
economies which are exposed to unanticipated inflation through nominal asset holdings. In 
particular, the inflation risk premium is higher when government debt is primarily nominal, 
steady-state inflation is low, and when cash and nominal debt account for a large fraction of 
consumers’ retirement portfolios.  These channels do not appear to have been highlighted in 
previous models or tested empirically. Numerical results suggest that the inflation risk 
premium is comparable in magnitude to standard representative agent models. These findings 
have implications for management of government debt, since the inflation risk premium 
makes it more costly for governments to borrow using nominal rather than indexed debt. 
Simulations of an extended model with Epstein-Zin preferences suggest that increasing the 
share of indexed debt would enable governments to permanently lower taxes by an amount 
that is quantitatively non-trivial.  
Keywords: government debt; inflation risk premium; overlapping generations. 
 
"The real question with respect to whether indexed debt will save the taxpayer money really 
gets down to an evaluation of the size and persistence of the so-called inflation risk premium 
that is associated with the level of nominal interest rates.” 
Alan Greenspan 
Remarks at a Joint Economic Committee hearing on “Inflation Indexing of Government 
Securities”, May 14, 19852  
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1. Introduction 
The inflation risk premium – the compensation demanded by risk-averse bondholders for 
bearing inflation risk – is of clear practical importance. For instance, the question of whether 
it is optimal to issue indexed government debt will depend in part on the expected cost of 
financing debt repayments. Other things being equal, a positive inflation risk premium 
implies that it is more costly for the government to borrow using nominal debt. Under these 
circumstances, the government could reduce its real borrowing costs by issuing debt that is 
indexed to the price level. This would enable the government to keep spending unchanged in 
real terms while permanently lowering taxes, or to increase government spending for any 
given path of taxes. In addition, estimates of the inflation risk premium are useful because 
they allow policymakers to make inferences about market inflation expectations using break-
even inflation rates, as argued by Bernanke (2004). Hence, the inflation risk premium 
matters.  
In a recent survey of the literature, Bekaert and Wang (2010) note that empirical estimates of 
inflation risk premia are generally positive but vary somewhat across studies, ranging from 0 
to over 200 basis points depending on the economy and maturity of debt considered. To 
better understand the factors that drive risk premia, several recent papers have solved for 
bond yields in New Keynesian models which are approximated to second-order (e.g. De Paoli 
et al., 2010; Hördahl et al., 2008). Because nominal prices are sticky in these models, 
monetary policy has real effects. As a result, the inflation risk premium – the covariance 
between the stochastic discount factor of the representative agent and inflation – depends 
crucially on the shocks that hit the economy and the response of the central bank to these 
shocks, as described by a Taylor rule. These papers also demonstrate that the strength of real 
and nominal rigidities is important for inflation risk premia in New Keynesian models.  
This paper makes two main contributions. First, using a general equilibrium model with 
flexible-prices, it highlights several alternative factors that matter for the inflation risk 
premium. In particular, an overlapping generations (OG) model is solved for a second-order 
accurate closed-form expression for the inflation risk premium. The key transmission 
mechanism in the model has previously been emphasised by Champ and Freeman (1990): in 
OG models, unanticipated monetary innovations have real effects, because unanticipated 
inflation erodes the real value of nominally denominated government debt. The contribution 
here is to show that this transmission mechanism matters for the inflation risk premium. This 
feature of the model is intuitively appealing since we would expect compensation for 
inflation risk to be higher in economies which are more exposed to unanticipated inflation 
through substantial holdings of nominal assets. Doepke and Schneider (2006) show that, in 
the postwar period, the US economy has been quite exposed to such fluctuations: a moderate 
episode of unanticipated inflation implies a substantial wealth loss for older agents, the main 
bondholders in the economy.
3
 Likewise, the old in Canada lose out significantly during 
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periods of unanticipated inflation due, in part, to their substantial holdings of nominal 
government debt (Meh et al., 2010).  
The model predicts the inflation risk premium will be higher in economies where government 
debt is primarily nominal, steady-state inflation is low, and where money and nominal debt 
are important sources of retirement consumption. Intuitively, economies in which nominal 
assets are a large fraction of private sector wealth are more vulnerable to inflation risk, 
because variations in the real returns on these assets imply fluctuations in retirement 
consumption. And since episodes of unexpectedly high inflation will squeeze consumption in 
retirement – raising the marginal utility of additional consumption – risk-averse agents will 
hold nominal debt only if it pays a premium over indexed debt. The mechanism by which 
nominal asset holdings matter for the inflation risk premium does not appear to have been 
highlighted in previous theoretical models or tested empirically. Numerical results indicate 
that the inflation risk premium is of a comparable magnitude to standard representative agent 
models, and that it depends crucially on the importance of nominal bonds as a source of 
retirement consumption and the share of the government debt that is nominal. These 
mechanisms may help to explain cross-country differences in empirical estimates of inflation 
risk premia. Empirical work testing the model predictions would be a feasible extension 
because the risk premium is related to observable macro variables. 
The second contribution of the paper is to show that the inflation risk premium has 
quantitatively relevant implications for fiscal policy and government debt management. Some 
general analytical results are first presented which show that the inflation risk premium is an 
important determinant of the cost of issuing nominal versus indexed debt. The analysis then 
turns to the case of a government that has a positive outstanding debt which it rolls over 
continuously while maintaining the level of real government spending and satisfying its 
budget constraint. The aim is to understand whether the implications of this policy for taxes 
are quantitatively relevant, and whether the answer hinges critically on the share of indexed 
government debt as a result of the inflation risk premium. Analytical results suggest that the 
share of indexed government debt is an important determinant of the level of taxes, but the 
sign of this effect is ambiguous because it depends on a precautionary savings effect as well 
as the inflation risk premium. However, numerical simulations from an extended model with 
Epstein-Zin preferences suggest that shifting from nominal to indexed debt would enable the 
government to permanently lower taxes by a non-trivial amount, because it can avoid paying 
the inflation risk premium. This finding suggests an interesting avenue for research on 
optimal management of government debt. It also has policy relevance given the relatively low 
shares of indexed debt in developed economies (Campbell et al. 2009; Kitamura, 2008).
4
     
The literature on optimal government debt management is neatly summarized by Barro 
(2003). A useful starting point is to note that if Ricardian equivalence does not hold because 
of distortionary taxes, tax-smoothing is optimal and pins down a desirable level of 
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government debt (Barro, 1979). However, distortionary taxes alone do not pin down the 
optimal composition of government debt by maturity or debt type. The composition of 
government debt only matters when, in addition, there is uncertainty about future government 
spending, the tax base, or asset prices. Several notable papers have studied optimal debt 
policy under these conditions, including Lucas and Stokey (1983), Persson et al. (1987) and 
Bohn (1988). As argued by Barro (2003), if there is uncertainty about government 
expenditures or the future tax base, it is optimal to issue long-term government debt. The 
reasoning is that short-term debt is subject to rollover risk (because future interest rates are 
uncertain), which leads to unexpected variations in real borrowing costs and so deviations 
from tax-smoothing. In addition, it would appear to be optimal from a tax-smoothing 
perspective to issue only indexed government debt, because the real borrowing rate on 
nominal debt will vary with unanticipated inflation.  
Issuing nominal government debt can, however, be justified on tax-smoothing grounds if 
inflation and government expenditure positively covary, as in Bohn (1988). Intuitively, a 
positive covariance implies a partial default (in real terms) on nominal debt at times when 
government spending is unexpectedly high, so that taxes will have to move less to bridge the 
gap between spending and revenue. The conventional wisdom on optimal maturity has also 
been challenged, most recently by Greenwood et al. (2010). Interestingly, the theoretical 
literature on optimal debt policy does not appear to have formally investigated the 
implications of the inflation risk premium. As Campbell and Shiller (1996) point out, these 
implications could be important because the government can avoid paying the inflation risk 
premium by issuing indexed debt, and so potentially lower its real borrowing rate. The 
simulation results in this paper provide evidence from a general equilibrium model that the 
fiscal implications of the inflation risk premium are quantitatively non-trivial. A full analysis 
of the welfare implications is beyond the scope of this paper but of obvious interest for future 
research. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 sets out the model. In Section 3, a closed-form 
analytical solution for the inflation risk premium is derived and its main predictions are 
discussed.  Section 4 then compares the numerical predictions of the solution with the 
existing literature. In Section 5 the fiscal implications of the inflation risk premium are 
investigated both analytically and quantitatively. Finally, Section 6 concludes.                  
2. Model 
Consider a two-period overlapping generations (OG) model in the spirit of Diamond (1965).
5
 
Each generation supplies one unit of labour in the first period, and retires in the second 
period. Utility is derived from consumption in both periods, and there is no bequest motive. 
The number of generations born each period is normalized to 1. Consumption by the young is 
denoted cY. The young are subject to a lump-sum tax T. Their after-tax wage income can used 
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for consumption in the same period or allocated to three assets – capital, indexed government 
bonds and nominal government bonds – in order to finance consumption in old age, cO. In 
addition, there is fiat money, M, in the economy, and each generation holds a positive amount 
of real money balances, m ≡ M/P. There are two sources of aggregate uncertainty: a 
productivity shock and a money supply shock. Each period lasts N years.   
Capital, k, is retained (without depreciation) and used an input in the production process next 
period, yielding a risky return r
k
. Bonds take the form of long-term government debt with a 
maturity of N years. Indexed bonds (b
i
) pay a riskless real return r
f 
next period, and nominal 
bonds (b
n
) a riskless nominal return R next period. The returns r
f
 and R are endogenously 
determined so that demand and supply for bonds are equated.
 
Because inflation cannot be 
forecast with certainty, nominal bonds are risky in real terms, with a real return of r
n
 = R/П, 
where П is the gross rate of inflation between youth and old age. The real return on money 
balances is r
m
 = 1/П. Money is therefore a dominated asset if R > 1. A positive demand for 
money is motivated by a legal requirement to hold real money balances of at least δ > 0, so 
that m ≥ δ. This constraint is assumed to bind with equality, i.e. m = δ.  
Champ and Freeman (1990) previously used this constraint to show that unanticipated money 
innovations affect real variables in an OG model, because unanticipated inflation lowers the 
real value of nominally denominated government debt.
6
 The same transmission mechanism 
plays a crucial role here, because government debt will pay an inflation risk premium only if 
unanticipated inflation erodes old generations’ consumption. Like Champ and Freeman, I 
assume money offers no transaction services to show that the main results follow from the 
effects of inflation on the real value of government debt, and not its effects on the mechanics 
of exchange. In order to satisfy the reserve requirement mt = δ, the young born each period 
must hold the entire money stock. To achieve this, they use their after-tax wage income to 
purchase the previous money stock, Mt-1, from the current old (who consume the proceeds) 
and the current period money injection, Mt – Mt-1, from the government. This leaves the 
young holding nominal money balances of Mt, and hence real balances of mt = δ.
7
   
2.1 Consumers 
The budget constraints faced by the young born in period t are 
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where v is the constant share of indexed bonds in the total bond portfolio, nt
i
tt bbb 111   . 
Consumers have CRRA preferences with a discount factor β and coefficient of relative risk 
aversion γ. The young of period t solve the following problem: 
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The first-order conditions are as follows: 
][1 11
k
ttt rsdfE     for capital, k                                        (3) 
][1 1 ttt SDFER    for nominal bonds, b
n
                                                  (4) 
][1 1 tt
f
t sdfEr                       for indexed bonds, b
i
                            (5) 
where    )/( ,,11 YtOtt ccsdf  and SDFt+1 ≡ sdft+1/Пt+1. 
2.2 Firms 
The production sector consists of a representative firm that produces output by combining 
capital and labour in a Cobb-Douglas production function. The share of capital in output is 
equal to α and the labour share is 1–α. The firm hires capital and labour to maximise current 
profits. Total factor productivity is denoted At. Assuming competitive markets, the real wage 
and the return on capital are: 
 ttt
k
ttt kAkryw )1(          (6) 
1/   tttt
k
t kAkyr         (7) 
Total factor productivity is stochastic and follows 
 )exp()( 1 ttt eAA
A
          (8) 
where et is an IID-normal innovation with mean zero and standard deviation σe,A. 
2.3 Government 
The government conducts fiscal policy and commits to a money supply rule and a bond 
supply rule. The total supply of government bonds must satisfy b = b
i
 + b
n  
> 0, and the shares 
of indexed and nominal bonds in the total bond portfolio are constant and equal to v and 1–v 
respectively. Government debt is assumed to be stationary and in positive net supply, but no 
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particular bond supply rule is specified at this stage to highlight the generality of the results 
that follow. Likewise, no specific assumptions are made at this stage about taxes and 
government spending, except that the implied path of primary deficits is consistent with the 
government budget constraint.   
The government budget constraint is given by  
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where gt is government spending in real terms. 
Government spending is exogenous and used up in projects that have no effect on utility. 
Nevertheless, it is important to include the government budget constraint to assess the fiscal 
implications of the inflation risk premium, as is done in Section 5. 
The government sets the nominal money supply Mt  ≡ Ptmt according to 
  )exp(* 1 ttt MM                               (10) 
where П* > 0 is the target money supply growth rate and εt is a money supply shock.  
The money supply shock is assumed to follow an AR(1) process, εt = ρM εt–1 + ut, where ut is 
an IID-normal innovation with mean zero and standard deviation σu,П. The target money 
supply growth rate is denoted П* because it plays the role of a constant inflation target in the 
model. In fact, since money market equilibrium and the legal constraint on cash holdings 
imply that Pt  = Mt /δ, inflation is equal to the money supply growth rate: 
 )exp(*/ 1 tttt MM                              (11) 
Notice that, in the absence of money supply innovations, inflation would be stabilized at the 
inflation target. Hence, monetary innovations are the sole source of inflation variations. This 
result depends on the assumption that monetary policy attempts to keep inflation at target, 
without any concern for consumption deviations. However, this is a natural assumption given 
the long horizon in the model and is consistent with the stated objectives of central banks – to 
stabilize in the short run and provide a stable nominal anchor in the long run (e.g. Bank of 
England, 1999). It is also consistent with long run empirical evidence on monetary neutrality 
and inflation (see Bullard,1999).  
2.4 Aggregate resource constraint 
Capital is assumed to depreciate fully within a period. It follows that investment in period t is 
given by it = kt+1. The economy’s aggregate resource constraint in period t is therefore 
 tttt gkcy  1                                                                                                       (12) 
where OtYtt ccc ,,    is aggregate consumption.     
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It is easy to verify using (1), (2), (6), (7) and (9) that this equation is satisfied in equilibrium. 
 
3. The inflation risk premium: analytical solution and discussion  
3.1 Solution 
A second-order approximation of the Euler equations (4) and (5) leads to 
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where ‘hats’ denote log deviations from steady-state and O[2] terms of order higher than two. 
Given that SDFt+1 ≡ sdft+1 / П+1 and ignoring terms higher than second-order, we have the 
following relationship between nominal and real interest rates: 
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The term in the big brackets in (15) is expected inflation. The covariance term is the inflation 
risk premium. It tells us that if inflation is high when the marginal utility of consumption is 
high, nominal bonds will pay a higher equilibrium interest rate to consumers to compensate 
for the fact that their real payoff will tend to be low at times when extra consumption is 
valued highly. Notice that since the covariance term in (15) is conditional on period-t 
information, it is only the component of marginal utility that is correlated with unanticipated 
inflation that matters for the inflation risk premium.
8
 The reason is simply that, as (15) makes 
clear, predictable changes in future inflation are reflected in a higher nominal yield through 
the expected inflation term. As usual, if the inflation risk premium is zero we end up with a 
Fisher equation relating nominal rates to real rates and expected inflation.
9
  
Denoting the inflation risk premium IRP we have   
 ]ˆ,ˆ[cov ]ˆ),ˆˆ([cov]ˆ,ˆ[cov 1,11,,111   tOtttYtOttttt cccfdsIRP             (16) 
And by Equation (2), and using the fact that mt = δ, 
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Here, θk ≡ αk
α
/cO is the steady-state share of capital income in retirement consumption, θb ≡ 
r
f
b/cO is the steady-state share of bond income in retirement consumption, and θm ≡ r
m
m/cO = 
m(П*)-1/cO is the steady-state share of cash holdings in retirement consumption. Notice that 
steady-state values are indicated by the absence of time subscripts. 
 
Using (17) in (16), the inflation risk premium is equal to
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Finally, since each period in the model lasts N years, the annualised inflation risk premium 
is
11
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3.2 Discussion 
Equations (18) and (19) show that the inflation risk premium depends positively on the share 
of nominal government debt, 1 – v, and the steady-state shares of bond income and cash 
holdings in consumer retirement portfolios, θb and θm respectively. These channels do not 
appear to have been discussed in previous theoretical literature. Increases in these shares raise 
the inflation risk premium because the old are more exposed to unanticipated inflation if a 
larger portion of their retirement portfolio is nominal. In fact, the term in square brackets,   
(1–v)θb + θm, is simply the total share of retirement consumption funded by nominal asset 
holdings. 
To bring out the economic factors that matter for the inflation risk premium more clearly, it is 
instructive to rewrite the expression in (19) as follows: 
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where μc ≡ cO /y is the steady-state fraction of old age consumption in GDP and the fact that 
r
m 
= 1/П* at steady-state has been used.  
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The expression shows that the inflation risk premium depends on several macro variables. It 
rises with the steady-state debt-GDP ratio and the share of nominal debt in the government 
bond portfolio, both of which depend on government debt policy.
12
 The inflation risk 
premium will also rise if there is a fall in the steady-state rate of inflation П* or if the steady-
state ratio of cash to GDP rises, two factors which depend upon monetary policy. Intuitively, 
lower trend inflation implies less erosion in the value of money holdings held into old age 
and so leaves consumers with a larger stock of nominal wealth vulnerable to unanticipated 
inflation. The intuition for the second effect is simply that, for any given trend inflation rate, 
a larger stock of nominal assets is carried into old age if the reserve requirement for money 
holdings is strengthened. 
It is worth pointing out some additional features of the analytical solution. First, notice that 
the inflation risk premium is unambiguously positive. The reason is that consumers hold 
nominal assets but have no nominal liabilities. In theory, introducing nominal liabilities could 
lead to a negative inflation risk premium, but only if these liabilities had a more important 
role in retiree portfolios than nominal assets. However, that seems unlikely because the main 
nominal liability for households is mortgages, and these are typically paid off before 
retirement. In support of this, Doepke and Schneider (2006) report that net nominal position 
of US households over 65 is strongly positive, while Meh and Terajima (2008) find the same 
result for Canada. It is also worth noting that empirical evidence points to an average 
inflation risk premium that is robustly positive at the long horizons relevant for the model 
here (see Bekaert and Wang, 2010).         
A second interesting feature of the analytical solution is that it implies that the inflation risk 
premium does not depend on productivity risk.
13
 Intuitively, productivity variations matters 
for the inflation risk premium only to the extent that the resulting fluctuations in marginal 
utility are correlated with the unpredictable component of inflation. In the model at hand, 
there is no such correlation because unanticipated variations in inflation result from money 
supply innovations, which are uncorrelated with innovations to productivity. In turn, this 
result is driven by the assumption that monetary policy does not attempt to stabilize 
consumption but instead aims at a constant inflation target. This assumption seems well 
founded, however, given the long horizon in the model. In particular, it is consistent with the 
widely held view that the best central banks can do in the long run is provide a stable nominal 
anchor for the economy.  
4. The inflation risk premium: numerical results 
To get an idea of how the model performs, it is instructive to plug appropriate numbers for a 
developed economy into (20). This is done in this section. The predicted inflation risk 
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premium is compared with the empirical and theoretical literature. The analysis then provides 
an assessment of which macro variables are likely to be most important for inflation risk 
premia.  
4.1 Numerical solution 
To compute the inflation risk premium, the parameters and ratios in (20) need to be assigned 
a numerical value. Canada was chosen for this purpose because it is fairly representative 
developed economy and has the advantage that detailed information is publicly available on 
the distribution of government debt by maturity and the importance of nominal asset 
positions. The calibration is summarised in Table 1. 
Table 1 – Calibrated values in the numerical analysis 
Parameter Value 
Number of years per period, N 30 
Coeff. of relative risk aversion, γ 4 
30yr Money supply innovation std, σu,П  0.14 
30yr Debt-to-GDP ratio, b/y 0.07 
Share of indexed govt. debt, v 0.25 
Old age consumption-GDP ratio, μc 0.30 
Cash-to-GDP ratio, m/y 0.02 
Inflation target, П* 1.81 
Risk-free real interest rate, r
f 
1.65 
 
The number of years per period N was set equal to 30, implying that bonds have a maturity of 
30 years. The coefficient of relative risk aversion was set equal to 4. This calibration is 
relatively high, but still plausible, to give the model a better chance of matching inflation risk 
premia in the data. The variance of the money supply innovation was set at 0.0196 
(=30*0.025
2
), which implies a 30-year standard deviation of 0.14 (=0.0196
1/2
). This 
calibration implies a standard deviation of annual inflation of 0.025 under the assumption of 
base-level drift in the price level.
14
 Consistent with this figure, the standard deviation of 
annual CPI inflation in Canada over the period 1980-2012 was approximately 2.5% (see 
Statistics Canada website). McCallum (1997) and Dittmar et al. (1999) have previously used 
the random walk assumption to compute inflation risk at long horizons.  
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 Annual inflation in the model is defined as the log of 
30/1)( t . 
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The share of indexed government debt v was set at 0.25, which is similar to the share of 30-
year Real Return Bonds in the total stock of 30-year government bonds (see Department of 
Finance Canada 2011, Table V and Chart 2). The debt-GDP ratio is set at 0.07 because total 
marketable government debt was 35% of GDP in 2011 and around 1/5
th
 of this total was  in 
30-year bonds; see Department of Finance (2011, Table 2 and Chart 2) and Bank of Canada 
(2012, Table H1). The steady-state ratio of old age consumption to GDP was set at 0.30, 
because aggregate consumption is around 60% of GDP, and this is assumed to be split 
equally between young and old agents. The steady-state share of money holdings in GDP is 
set at 0.02 and the inflation target П* at 1.81 (=1.0230), based on the annual inflation target of 
2%.
15
 Finally, the steady-state risk-free real rate was set at 1.65, consistent with an annual 
real interest rate of 1.7% and an annual nominal interest rate of 3.7%. 
Plugging these values into (20) implies an inflation risk premium of 8.6 basis points. This is 
economically non-trivial but roughly an order of magnitude lower than most empirical 
estimates in the literature. Of course, the difficulties that theoretical models face in matching 
asset prices and risk-premia are well-known and apply to both bonds and equity (Mehra and 
Prescott, 1985; Backus et al., 1989; Rudebsuch and Swanson, 2008), so it is perhaps not 
surprising that the OG model fails to match the magnitude of inflation risk premia in the data. 
It is nevertheless of interest to compare the numerical solution with the literature to get an 
idea of how it compares with representative agent models. This is done in the next section 
after a brief review of the empirical literature. 
4.2 Comparison with the literature 
Empirical studies 
In a recent survey of the empirical literature, Bekaert and Wang (2010) show that there is no 
clear consensus on the magnitude of the inflation risk premium. In particular, while empirical 
estimates of the inflation risk premium are generally positive, they vary somewhat across 
studies, ranging from 0 to over 200 basis points depending on maturity and the economy 
considered.
 16
 A standard approach in the empirical literature has been to estimate no-
arbitrage affine models of the term structure using nominal yields and inflation data. More 
recently, however, several studies have included additional information from index-linked 
yields, inflation surveys or inflation swaps, or have combined a reduced-form model of the 
term structure with structural equations from DSGE models. The literature has focused 
mainly on three developed economies: the US, the Euro Area and UK. 
US studies have generally found a strongly positive average inflation risk premium. For 
example, D’Amico et al. (2009) found an inflation risk premium on 10-year bonds of 64 basis 
points on average, while Ang et al. (2008) and Campbell and Viceira (2001) report a higher 
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 Currency outside banks was around 3.3% of GDP in 2011, so this calibration may be on the conservative side. 
16
 Of the ten recent studies reviewed by Bekeart and Wang, one reports a negative inflation risk premium. 
However, this is likely to be driven by the presence of a significant ‘liquidity premium’ in the US TIPS market 
from its creation in 1997 up until 2004.  
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average risk premium of around 110 basis points. The largest estimate in the recent literature 
appears to be the 201 basis points reported by Chernov and Mueller (2012), while the lowest 
is the average of zero reported by Christensen et al. (2010).  In the Euro Area, by contrast, 
inflation risk premia appear to be much lower. For instance, Garcia and Werner (2010) report 
an inflation risk premium at a 5-year maturity of around 25 basis points, while Hördahl and 
Tristani (2012) find an average risk premium at a 10-year maturity of just over 20 basis 
points. A recent study on Canada by Feunou and Fontaine (2012) also finds a modest 
inflation risk premium on 5-year bonds. In the UK the picture is more mixed, with Risa 
(2001) reporting a large average inflation risk premium of 184 basis points on 5-year bonds, 
compared to around 100 basis points in Joyce et al. (2010), and around 50 in Andreasen 
(2012). To the author’s knowledge, the only study to estimate the average inflation risk 
premium on 30-year bonds is the US study by Haubrich et al. (2008), who report an estimate 
of 101 basis points.  
While there is no clear consensus on the magnitude of the inflation risk premium, the bulk of 
empirical evidence points to a premium that is robustly positive and increasing at long 
maturities. As Bekaert and Wang (2010) note, much of the variation across studies is likely 
due to different sample periods or differences in information used in estimation. Economic 
factors may also play a role, particularly in explaining cross-country differences such as the 
relatively low inflation risk premium in the Euro Area. However, most of the studies in the 
empirical literature struggle to shed light on the economic fundamentals that matter for 
inflation risk premia due to their reliance on reduced-form models.
17
 As a result, theoretical 
models have also played an important role in the recent literature.  
Theoretical models 
To better understand the economic fundamentals drive bond prices and inflation risk premia, 
several researchers have turned to theoretical models of the economy. For instance, Hördahl 
et al. (2008) set up a small-scale New Keynesian model with habit formation and show that it 
can resolve several bond pricing puzzles while providing a fairly good fit to key 
macroeconomic variables. To better understand the economic mechanisms at work, they 
provide analytical solutions for bond prices based on second-order perturbation 
approximations. These solutions show that a strong degree of interest rate smoothing is 
crucial. They also shed light on the importance of nominal rigidities, as a flex-price version 
of the model cannot replicate the same results as under sticky prices. The inflation risk 
premium in the model is positive but modest at less than 5 basis points for maturities up to 1 
year and virtually zero for longer maturities up to 10 years.  
More recently, De Paoli et al. (2010) set up a small-scale New Keynesian model with real 
rigidities and solve it numerically using a second-order perturbation method. They show that 
the impact of nominal rigidities on risk-premia depends on whether the economy is 
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 The exceptions are Andreasen (2012), Hördahl and Tristani (2012) and Buraschi and Jiltsov (2005). 
Andreasen estimates a full structural general equilibrium model. Hördahl and Tristani and Buraschi and Jiltsov 
add equations from structural economic models into estimated affine models of the term structure. 
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dominated by productivity or monetary policy shocks. For instance, with perfectly flexible 
prices, the inflation risk premium is zero if there are monetary policy shocks only, but this 
rises to 35 basis points when productivity shocks are introduced. With sticky prices, the 
inflation risk premium is lower at 9 basis points with only productivity shocks, and it is 
negative in an economy dominated by monetary policy shocks. 
Finally, Andreasen (2012) builds on these earlier findings by estimating a medium-scale New 
Keynesian model of the UK economy with several different shocks and rigidities using a 
third-order approximation that allows for time-varying risk premia. He concludes that there 
was a substantial fall in nominal term premia in the 1990s caused mainly by a reduction in 
inflation risk premia and driven by preference, investment, and fixed cost shocks, as well as a 
more aggressive response to inflation by the Bank of England. The 5-year inflation risk 
premium from the model averages around 50 basis points, which is of the same order of 
magnitude as empirical studies and somewhat higher than in small-scale calibrated models 
like De Paoli et al. (2010) and Hördahl et al. (2008).
18
  
These results suggest that standard DSGE models may soon be able to provide a reasonable 
fit to asset risk-premia and key macroeconomic variables. It should be noted, however, that 
the shocks and rigidities that drive risk premia in the above models do not always admit an 
easy real-world economic interpretation, because they are not directly unobservable. In this 
regard, it is interesting that the analytical solutions in the current paper relate the inflation risk 
premium to observable macro variables. It is also notable that the predicted inflation risk 
premium is of similar size to other small-scale calibrated models like Hördahl et al. (2008) 
and De Paoli et al. (2010). The next section uses the analytical solution for the inflation risk 
premium to shed light on which macro variables are likely to be most important for 
understanding inflation risk premia in developed economies. 
4.3 Which variables matter for the inflation risk premium? 
The analytical solution for the inflation risk premium shows that it depends on several 
different macro variables under the control of policymakers, namely, trend inflation; the 
ratios of money balances and government debt to GDP; and the share of indexed government 
debt. This section investigates which of these factors are likely to be important for explaining 
inflation risk premia in developed economies. To do so, a simple sensitivity analysis is 
conducted using the calibrated analytical expression from the previous section. In particular, 
a single share or parameter of interest is varied with all others held constant at their baseline 
values. The results are shown in Figure 1. 
The inflation risk premium is quite sensitive to both the share of indexed debt and the debt-
GDP ratio, suggesting that these are potentially important channels by which government 
policy could have an effect. For example, increasing the 30-year debt ratio from the baseline 
value of 0.07 to 0.10 increases the inflation risk premium from 8.6 basis points to 11.9 – an 
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 As Andreasen notes, his risk-premia results rely on high risk aversion through Epstein-Zin preferences.  
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increase of well over one quarter. On the other hand, lowering the debt ratio to 0.04 lowers 
the risk premium to less than 6 basis points. Increasing the share of debt that is indexed has 
the effect of lowering the inflation risk premium. The effect here is also relatively strong: 
increasing the indexation share from 0.25 to 0.40 lowers the inflation risk premium by around 
1.6 basis points. 
Fig 1 – Inflation risk premium and key macro variables 
 
Notes: Vertical axis is measured in basis points per annum 
By contrast, the monetary variables have relatively little impact. For instance, increasing the 
ratio of cash to GDP by one-half to 0.03 raises the inflation risk premium by approximately 1 
basis point. The effect from the inflation target is even smaller due to its non-linear impact on 
the inflation risk premium: raising trend inflation from 1% per annum (x-axis intercept) to the 
baseline value of 2% lowers the inflation risk premium by around 0.3 basis points, and a 
further increase to 3% per annum (x-axis end point) reduces the inflation risk premium by 
only an additional 0.25 basis points. While these numerical findings are clearly conditional 
on the calibration for Canada, they are likely to generalise somewhat given that developed 
economies have similar levels of average inflation and a monetary base that is small relative 
to GDP and the stock of government debt. 
4.4 Sensitivity of the inflation risk premium 
The inflation risk premium of 8.6 basis points depends on the coefficient of relative risk 
aversion, the quantity of inflation risk, and the share of retirement consumption funded by 
nominal assets, (1–v)θb + θm. In this section I consider sensitivity to these calibrated values. 
Figure 2 shows the how the inflation risk premium varies with risk aversion and the quantity 
of inflation risk, where the latter is defined by the standard deviation of the money supply 
innovation. Unsurprisingly, the inflation risk premium is sensitive to these calibrated values. 
For instance, if the coefficient of relative risk aversion is reduced to 1 (ie the case of log 
utility), then the inflation risk premium falls to only 2 basis points per annum, while it rises to 
16 
 
over 15 basis points under a relatively high risk aversion coefficient of 7. Sensitivity to the 
quantity of inflation risk is even greater: the inflation risk premium falls to around 3 basis 
points with a standard deviation of 0.08, but a standard deviation of 0.2 raises the inflation 
risk premium to more than 17.5 basis points.
19
 Despite this sensitivity, the inflation risk 
premium is comparable under low calibrations to bond risk premia in canonical DSGE 
models such as Rudebusch and Swanson (2008).
20
 This finding suggests the transmission 
mechanism in the OG model may be of help in generating non-trivial bond risk premia.  
Fig 2 – Inflation risk premium: risk aversion and the quantity of inflation risk 
                                   
Notes: Vertical axis is measured in basis points per annum 
 
It is also of interest to consider the implications of an alternative calibration for the total share 
of retirement consumption funded by nominal assets, (1–v)θb + θm. We can make such a 
calibration using the data on Canadian nominal portfolios in Meh et al. (2010). In particular, 
they report that the net nominal position of consumers in 66-75 age group is 28% of their net 
worth, and this figure rises to 32% for the over 75s. Taking the mid-point of 30% implies a 
calibrated value of (1–v)θb + θm = 0.30.
21
 The implied inflation risk premium is 7.8 basis 
points. This value is lower than the baseline of 8.6 basis points, but the difference is fairly 
small since the implied share of nominal assets under the baseline calibration is similar at 
0.33. Therefore, the numerical results appear to be robust to alternative ways of calibrating 
the nominal asset share in the model.    
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 The low standard deviation of 0.08 corresponds to an annual inflation standard deviation of around 1.5%, and 
the high standard deviation of 0.2 to an annual standard deviation of around 3.7%. 
20
 Rudebusch and Swanson show that a benchmark New Keynesian model produces a 10-year term premium on 
nominal bonds of only 1.4 basis points. 
21
 The share in net worth can be interpreted as the consumption share because the old consume all their wealth.  
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5. Fiscal implications of the inflation risk premium 
The results of the previous section suggest that government debt policy could have important 
implications for the inflation risk premium and that this conclusion does not hinge on a 
specific calibration of the model. With this in mind, the fiscal implications of the inflation 
risk premium are investigated in this section. The analysis concentrates on the the share of 
indexed debt in the government bond portfolio since – as the quote at the start of this paper 
suggests – the inflation risk premium may be an important cost consideration for 
governments who can issue both indexed and nominal debt, because issuing indexed debt 
avoids paying the inflation risk premium.  
The analysis starts by presenting some general analytical results that clarify the meaning of 
‘fiscal implications’ of the inflation risk premium. It then turns to the example of a 
government that has a positive amount of debt that it wishes to roll over while maintaining 
the real level of government spending; it does this by allowing taxes to adjust to ensure that 
its budget constraint is satisfied. The question addressed here is: are the tax implications of 
this policy quantitatively relevant, and does the answer hinge critically on the share of 
government debt that is indexed as a result of the inflation risk premium? Some analytical 
results are first derived. The analysis then turns to numerical results from a simulated model. 
5.1 Analytical results 
5.1.1 A general result 
As shown in Section 3, the inflation risk premium introduces a wedge in the Fisher equation. 
As a result, it will generally have implications for government borrowing costs. We can see 
this formally by taking a second-order Taylor expansion of the real return on nominal bonds 
and subtracting our second-order accurate expression for the risk-free rate given by (13).  
As is shown in Appendix A, this leads to the following real return differential: 
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where t.i.i.r. denotes ‘terms independent of inflation risk.’22    
The first term on the right hand side shows that the real return on nominal debt will fall when 
inflation is unexpectedly high. Lucas and Stokey (1983) showed that, for this reason, the 
government has an incentive to inflate away its nominal debt if it cannot commit to a 
monetary policy that delivers a predetermined path for prices. This ability to reduce nominal 
liabilities ex post through surprise inflation could be one reason that governments appear to 
favour nominal debt over indexed debt. However, (21) shows us that the real return payable 
on nominal debt may exceed that on indexed debt even at times when inflation is 
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 To ease notation, 
n
trˆ  denotes the second-order accurate solution here. See Appendix A for the full derivation. 
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unexpectedly high, because it also includes the positive inflation risk premium.
23
 Moreover, 
(21) tells us that the expected differential in real returns – which is what matters for a 
government committed to achieving an inflation target – will tend to be positive due to the 
inflation risk premium. We can see this formally from the conditional expectation of (21): 
     ....]2[]ˆˆ[ 11 riitOIRPrrE
f
t
n
tt                   (22) 
To consider the full fiscal implications of (21) and (22), we need the government budget 
constraint and some assumptions about government policy. The next section sets out these 
assumptions. Analytical and quantitative results are then reported for the example at hand.   
5.1.2 Tax implications of inflation risk premium 
Let us suppose that the government has a positive amount of outstanding debt that it wishes 
to roll over (under the assumption that it can commit to money supply rule) while 
maintaining the real level of government spending and satisfying its budget constraint. It 
implements this policy by allowing lump-sum taxes Tt to adjust to ensure that the government 
budget constraint holds with equality in every period.  
Taxes are therefore given by 
   
]1[]1)1([     
])1([
1
111




m
t
n
t
f
t
tt
m
ttt
n
t
f
ttt
rbrvvrg
mmrbbrvvrgT
                 (23) 
where g ( b ) is the constant level of real government spending (the total bond supply) and the 
fact that mt = δ has been used. 
The expression in (23) makes clear that a government wishing to hold government spending 
constant and roll over its debt must adjust taxes to cover the borrowing rate it faces on its 
overall debt portfolio, minus any contribution from the inflation tax on money. In turn, the 
overall borrowing rate depends on the real rates payable on indexed and nominal debt and the 
constant fractions of each type of debt in the government bond portfolio, as given by the 
shares v and 1–v. As (21) and (22) indicate, the inflation risk premium will be an important 
factor affecting the real return payable on nominal versus indexed debt. However, issuing 
indexed debt to avoid paying the inflation risk premium is generally not enough to guarantee 
an unambiguous reduction in the level of taxes.  
In fact, as shown in Appendix B, a second-order accurate expression for taxes is 
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In (24) the term JI is the Jensen’s inequality correction term in nominal interest rates, while 
PSП  is the precautionary savings effect due to inflation risk – that is, additional saving to 
guard against the possibility that unexpectedly high inflation next period will push 
consumption below its optimal level.
24
 An increase in precautionary saving pushes down the 
equilibrium risk-free rate, so that the level of taxes needed to satisfy the government budget 
constraint is lower. Notice also that, intuitively, the incentive to engage in precautionary 
saving falls as the share of indexed government debt v increases. Turning to the inflation risk 
premium, it has been written as IRP – JI, since this term will be positive for a standard 
calibration of risk aversion. Hence, (24) tells us that the effect of inflation risk on the level of 
taxes depends on two opposing forces: the inflation risk premium term and the precautionary 
savings effect. In addition, there is a squared term in inflation deviations which pushes up 
taxes. The coefficient on this term, ϕ3, falls as the indexation share is increased. Since this 
last term is time-varying, it is instructive to focus on the average level of taxes.  
Taking the conditional expectation of (24) gives 
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This equation shows that taxes will be higher, on average, if the inflation risk premium and 
inflation variance term dominate the precautionary savings effect. Moreover, it is clear that 
the impact on taxes will depend on the share of indexed government debt v, though the effect 
of increasing v will generally be ambiguous due to the precautionary savings effect. For 
instance, if the share of indexed debt is increased, this will lower level of taxes through a fall 
in the inflation risk premium and a reduction in the coefficients on the inflation risk premium 
and inflation variance terms in (25), but there will be a simultaneous increase in taxes due to 
the fall in precautionary saving that results when future consumption is less vulnerable to 
inflation variations. It is not possible in general to say whether a rise in the share of indexed 
debt will lower taxes, or whether the inflation risk premium will play an important role. 
Numerical analysis is needed to settle this issue. 
 
The next section therefore uses numerical simulations of a calibrated model. To produce a 
plausible inflation risk premium, the model is augmented with Epstein-Zin preferences. 
These preferences help the model to match inflation risk premia in the data as they allow the 
coefficient of relative risk aversion and elasticity of intertemporal substitution to be calibrated 
separately. 
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 The definition of precautionary saving used here corresponds to that in De Paoli and Zabczyk (2013).  
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5.2 Simulated results: Tax implications of the inflation risk premium 
In this section, the example in 5.1.2 is investigated quantitatively using a simulated version of 
the model with Epstein-Zin preferences. The main advantage of these preferences is that the 
elasticity of intertemporal substitution and the coefficient of relative risk aversion are 
calibrated separately, so that a high coefficient of relative risk aversion need not imply an 
implausibly low elasticity of intertemporal substitution. Andreasen (2012) and Rudebusch 
and Swanson (2012) show that these preferences enable otherwise standard New Keynesian 
models to produce plausible bond risk premia without compromising their ability to fit key 
macro variables. These preferences also imply that the second-order accurate solution for the 
inflation risk premium is the same as under CRRA preferences.  
5.2.1 The model with Epstein-Zin preferences 
Consumers 
With Epstein-Zin preferences, consumers solve a maximization problem of the form 
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where γ is the coefficient of relative risk aversion and 1/(1–ε) is the elasticity of intertemporal 
substitution. 
The first-order conditions are still given by (3)–(5) but, as shown in Appendix C, the 
stochastic discount factor is now given by 
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The remainder of the model is unchanged. It is worth briefly considering the implications of 
Epstein-Zin preferences for the inflation risk premium. Since only the stochastic discount 
factor has changed, it follows that a second-order accurate expression for the inflation risk 
premium is given by 
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However, it is shown in the appendix that  
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Hence, the analytical solution for the inflation risk premium is equal to that under CRRA 
preferences for any given calibration of the coefficient of relative risk aversion: 
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Thus, the analytical solution for the inflation risk premium derived in Section 3 remains valid 
for understanding the risk premium in the extended model with Epstein-Zin preferences. 
Government 
It is worth briefly clarifying the role of the government. As discussed above, the government 
uses lump-sum taxes to ensure that it satisfies its budget constraint while making a constant 
level of real government purchases each period and rolling over a constant level of 
government debt. This situation is chosen because it is broadly representative of developed 
economies around the world: debt levels are positive and governments are under political 
pressure to maintain spending in real terms. 
With government spending constant at g and debt constant at ,b  taxes are given by 
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The assumption of constant government spending is made for convenience. This assumption 
could easily be relaxed in favour of a specification where spending followed an exogenous 
stochastic process, but this would not provide any additional insights. On the other hand, the 
assumption that government debt is constant is important, since the aim of the analysis is to 
isolate the ceteris paribus implications of the inflation risk premium for taxes – and this 
necessitates varying the share of indexed government debt v while holding the total amount 
of debt constant. 
It is important to note that although the bond supply is a constant, it cannot simply be 
assigned any desired numerical value because it must be consistent with a steady-state 
solution of the model.
25
 Here, steady-state bond supply rules of the following form are 
considered: 
 1 = (χ/β)sdf EZ                    (32)  
where χ is a positive parameter and sdf EZ is the steady-state real stochastic discount factor.  
A rule of this kind was chosen because it implies a unique steady-state that can be solved for 
analytically. The constant bond supply implied by this rule is derived in Appendix D, and the 
full steady-state solution of the model is listed in Appendix E. Under the bond supply rule in 
(32), the steady-state real interest rate is equal to χ/β and there is a simple linear relationship 
between consumption in youth and consumption in old age, which depends on χ. This 
relationship is used to choose an appropriate calibrated value, as discussed in the next section.  
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 The difficulty is that the steady-state Euler equation will not collapse to 1 = βrf as in a representative agent 
model. Instead, it is given by 1 = r
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 = βrf(cO/cY) 
–γ
 , which is difficult to solve analytically.  
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5.2.2 Calibrating the model  
The model is calibrated for Canada. The full calibration is listed in Table 2. As in the 
numerical analysis of Section 4, the number of years per period N is 30, the inflation target 
П* is set at 1.81 (=1.0230), the variance of the money supply innovation is 0.0196, and the 
share of indexed government debt is 0.25. Because Epstein-Zin preferences break the link 
between risk aversion and the elasticity of intertemporal substitution, the coefficient of 
relative risk aversion was assigned a much higher value than in the numerical analysis of 
Section 4. In particular, γ was set at 16 in order to give an inflation risk premium of around 
20 basis points. This value is consistent with Euro Area studies such as Garcia and Werner 
(2010) and Hördahl and Tristani (2012), as well as the results for Canada in Feunou and 
Fontaine (2012) which likewise suggest a positive but modest average inflation risk premium.  
The parameter ε was set at –0.35, which implies an elasticity of intertemporal substitution of 
0.74. The risk aversion and intertemporal elasticity calibrations are close to those in Olovsson 
(2010), who also studies an OG model with Epstein-Zin preferences. The discount factor β 
was set at 0.64, which corresponds to an annual discount factor of 0.985. 
Table 2 – Calibrated values in the simulated model 
Parameter Value 
Number of years per period, N 30 
Private discount factor, β 0.64 
Coeff. of relative risk aversion, γ 16 
Elasticity of intertemporal substitution, 1/(1–ε) 0.74 
Share of indexed govt. debt, v 0.25 
Real government spending, g  0.096 
30-yr government debt, b  0.026 
Bond supply parameter, χ 0.90 
Inflation target, П* 1.81 
Money supply innovation persistence, ρM 0.50 
30yr Money supply innovation std, σu,П 0.14 
Share of capital in output, α 0.24 
Productivity persistence, ρA 0.80 
30yr Productivity innovation std, σe,A 0.10 
Reserve requirement for money holdings, δ 0.01 
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The degree of persistence in the money supply innovation ρM was set at 0.5 because there is 
evidence that inflation persistence has fallen in the Great Moderation period (e.g. Benati, 
2008). The productivity shock is assumed to be strongly persistent (ρA = 0.80) and to have an 
innovation variance of 0.010. Together, these values imply an unconditional 30-year standard 
deviation of productivity of around 16.7%. The parameter α was set equal to 0.243, implying 
that capital income accounts for 24.3% of GDP and wage income for 75.7%. This value is a 
little on the low side compared to standard calibrations but helps the model to match the 
investment-GDP and debt-GDP ratios in the data. The parameter χ in the bond supply 
equation (32) was set equal to 0.90 because this implies that, at the deterministic steady-state, 
consumption by the young is slightly higher than consumption by the old, consistent with the 
retirement consumption puzzle. 
On the fiscal side, real government spending was fixed at 0.096, which implies that a 
plausible share of GDP is accounted for by public expenditure. The steady-state bond supply 
implied by the bond supply rule is 0.026, which implies a reasonable ratio of 30-year 
government debt to GDP.  Finally, the parameter δ was set at 0.01 since this implies a ratio of 
real money holdings to GDP of around 2%, which is fairly similar to the actual ratio. 
 
 5.2.3 Steady-state solution 
The model was solved using a second-order perturbation in Dynare (Julliard, 2001). The 
steady-state solution is reported in Table 3, with target values based on Canadian data. The 
values reported come from the deterministic steady-state solution, with the exception of the 
inflation risk premium, which is based on the theoretical mean of the stochastic solution.
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Table 3 – Steady-state solution of the model 
 Model Target 
Consumption:Output 
CY:Output    
 CO:Output 
0.66 
0.34 
0.32 
0.60 
0.32 
0.28 
Investment:Output 0.17 0.17 
Govt. spending:Output 0.17 0.23 
30yr Govt. debt:Output 0.05 0.07 
Real returns (r
k
, r
n
, r
f
) 1.14 1.50 
Nominal interest rate R 
Inflation risk premium 
3.11 
19.0 basis points 
3.50 
20.0 basis points 
                 Notes: Interest rates are annualised and in percentage points.  
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 The numerical solution for the inflation risk premium matches the analytical solution in (30) exactly. 
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Overall, the model does a fairly good job of matching the data. The ratios of consumption, 
investment and government expenditure are plausible, though the model struggles to match 
the relatively low consumption-GDP ratio in Canada. The ratio of 30-year debt to GDP 
undershoots its target value of 7%, but the model still generates an inflation risk premium 
close to the target of 20 basis points with a calibration of Epstein-Zin preferences similar to 
previous work in OG models (see Olovsson 2010). The real returns on capital, indexed 
bonds, and nominal bonds are equal at the deterministic steady-state at 1.1% per annum, 
implying a steady-state nominal interest rate of 3.1% given the annual inflation target of 2%. 
The target nominal interest rate of 3.5% is based on the yield on nominal government debt in 
Canadian data (see Bank of Canada, 2012) and the target real interest rate of 1.5% was 
calculated by subtracting 2% from the target nominal rate to account for the inflation target.   
5.2.4 Results 
The baseline results from the second-order stochastic solution are shown in Figure 3. The 
first panel shows that the average real return on government debt, vr
f
+(1–v)rn, falls as the 
share of indexed debt is increased.  The effect is quantitatively quite large: moving from 
nominal debt only to a case where all debt is indexed reduces the average real return by 
around 35 basis points. As shown by the second panel, this reduction is driven by the 
inflation risk premium, which falls by around 20 basis points as we move from an economy 
with only nominal debt to one with only indexed debt. It is notable that the reduction in the 
real borrowing rate exceeds the reduction in the inflation risk premium alone.  
The reason is that a fall in the inflation risk premium lowers borrowing costs in two ways. 
First, a fall in inflation risk premium has a direct impact on the nominal interest rate, as can 
be seen from (15). This first effect lowers the real borrowing rate on nominal government 
debt relative to that on indexed debt, as (21) and (22) show. Second, as Equation (B11) of the 
Appendix indicates, a fall in the inflation risk premium will generally lower the equilibrium 
real return on indexed debt because it implies a fall in expected consumption in old age. 
Hence, real borrowing rates on both nominal and indexed government debt fall as the share of 
indexed debt is increased, so that the overall reduction in borrowing costs exceeds the 
reduction in the real cost of nominal debt. 
Due to the reduction in the real borrowing rate, the average level of taxes necessary to meet 
the government spending target falls as the share of indexed debt is increased. The effect on 
taxes is surprising large given the magnitude of the inflation risk premium. For example, 
moving from an economy with only nominal debt to one with only indexed debt lowers 
lump-sum taxes from around 0.134 to less than 0.126 – a reduction of more than 6.5%. It 
should also be emphasised that this reduction is permanent. These baseline results suggest 
that the share of indexed government debt has non-trivial implications for taxes due to the 
inflation risk premium. It is clearly important for this conclusion that the model can produce a 
plausible risk premium through Epstein-Zin preferences.   
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Fig 3 – Tax implications of the inflation risk premium  
 
 Notes: Real return is annualised and in percentage points. It is defined as log[(mean return)1/30].  
 
5.2.5. Sensitivity analysis 
As the baseline results rely on a particular calibration, it is instructive to consider whether we 
reach the same conclusion under alternative calibrations of key parameters. The results of a 
sensitivity analysis of this kind are reported in Figure 4 for six parameters: the coefficient of 
relative risk aversion; the output share of capital; the elasticity of intertemporal substitution; 
the discount factor; and the standard deviations of the innovations to money supply and 
productivity. Each panel shows the percentage reduction in lump-sum taxes as the share of 
indexed government debt is increased from 0 to 1. The baseline reduction in taxes is shown 
by the solid blue line in each panel.  
The percentage reductions in lump-sum taxes are fairly similar to the baseline case, except 
for the capital share of output and the standard deviation of the money supply innovation. 
Relatively small changes in the former have quite a large impact on the reduction in taxes 
because this parameter is crucial for matching the ratio of 30-year debt to GDP. For instance, 
setting a slightly higher value than the baseline calibration pushes down the debt-to-GDP 
ratio and leads to an increase in capital holdings, so that the model overshoots the investment-
GDP ratio while undershooting the debt-GDP ratio by more than in the baseline case. Since 
overall nominal asset holdings fall somewhat, the inflation risk premium does also, reducing 
the potential savings from moving to indexed debt. On the other hand, the money supply 
standard deviation is important because it determines the quantity of inflation risk in the 
model. 
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Fig 4 – Tax implications of the IRP: sensitivity analysis 
 
Overall, the baseline conclusion that shifting from nominal to indexed debt would allow taxes 
to be reduced by a non-trivial amount appears to be robust. Indeed, the percentage reduction 
in taxes exceeds 3.5% in all cases in Figure 4, and it is considerably higher in all cases but 
one. Therefore, the inflation risk premium appears to be of quantitative importance. In 
particular, the potential costs savings from avoiding the inflation risk premium by issuing 
indexed government debt appear to be non-trivial, both in terms of the impact on the real 
borrowing rate and the implied impact on taxes through the government budget constraint. 
An interesting question is whether these cost savings are important for social welfare.         
6. Conclusion 
This paper presents a general equilibrium model in which nominal government debt pays an 
inflation risk premium. In contrast to standard representative agent models, the model 
predicts that nominal asset holdings matter for this premium. This feature of the model is 
intuitively appealing since we would expect the inflation risk premium to be higher in 
economies where holdings of nominal assets are substantial, since they will be more 
vulnerable to unanticipated variations in inflation. Doepke and Schneider (2006) show that, 
as the main bondholders in the US economy, older agents have been quite exposed to 
episodes of unanticipated inflation, and Meh et al. (2010) show that the same is true of 
Canada. In order to focus in on the implications for old agents, the model contains 
overlapping generations that live for only two periods: youth and old age. Since unexpectedly 
high inflation pushes down the ex post real return on nominal retirement assets, high marginal 
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utility goes hand-in-hand with unexpectedly high inflation. Consequently, the inflation risk 
premium is positive.     
The model makes several predictions about the macro variables that matter for the inflation 
risk premium, as highlighted using a closed-form analytical solution. In particular, it is higher 
in economies where government debt is primarily nominal, steady-state inflation is low, and 
where money and nominal debt account for a large share of retirement consumption. The 
nominal asset channel by which the above factors matter for the inflation risk premium does 
not appear to have been highlighted in previous theoretical literature or tested empirically. To 
assess whether these channels are likely to be of quantitative importance, numerical values 
for a developed economy were plugged into the analytical solution. The implied inflation risk 
premium was 8.6 basis points and sensitivity analysis showed that both the total supply of 
government debt and share of indexed debt are likely to be important for the magnitude of the 
premium. Although the predicted inflation risk premium is somewhat lower than most 
estimates in the empirical literature, it is comparable to those obtained from small-scale 
representative agent models such as Hördahl et al. (2008) and De Paoli et al. (2010). 
These findings suggest that further work to understand inflation risk premia in overlapping 
generations models may be beneficial. Indeed, since the key transmission mechanism in the 
model – the nominal asset channel by which unanticipated inflation has real effects – has 
already received attention in quantitative overlapping generations models used to study the 
distributional effects of unanticipated inflation (Dopeke and Schneider, 2006; Meh et al., 
2010), these models could be extended to provide a more reliable quantitative assessment of 
the channels that matter for the inflation risk premium. Empirical work could also test the 
predictions of the model for inflation risk premia – a task which is feasible given that the 
inflation risk premium is related to observable macro variables such as the share of indexed 
government debt and the steady-state inflation rate.     
The paper also contributes to the literature on optimal government debt management. First, 
some general analytical results were presented showing that the inflation risk premium is an 
important determinant of the cost of issuing nominal versus indexed debt. Second, the case of 
a government with outstanding debt and constant real government spending was considered 
to focus on the fiscal implications of the inflation risk premium. Analytical results were used 
to show that, as a result of the inflation risk premium, the share of indexed government debt 
is likely to be an important determinant of the level of taxes. Third, in support of these 
results, simulations were used to assess the quantitative impact of the indexation share on the 
level of taxes. In order to make this analysis more meaningful, the model was augmented 
with Epstein-Zin preferences to enable it to produce plausible inflation risk premia. The main 
finding was that shifting from nominal debt to indexed debt would enable governments to 
permanently lower taxes by a non-trivial amount, due to the cost saving from avoiding the 
inflation risk premium. A topic of obvious interest for future research would be a welfare 
analysis of the optimal share of indexed debt in the presence of the inflation risk premium. 
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Technical Appendix 
A – Second-order accurate expression for the real returns differential 
The real return on nominal government debt is given by 
  
t
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Taking a second-order Taylor series approximation on both sides leads to 
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where ‘hats’ denote log deviations from the deterministic steady-state.  
Using the solution for the nominal rate in main text, cancelling common terms and ignoring any terms 
of higher than second order, we have:
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where t.i.i.r. denotes ‘terms independent of inflation risk’ and 
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....]ˆ[ 21 riitE tt    has been used. 
Finally, subtracting the risk-free rate (which is second-order accurate) from both sides gives us a 
second-order accurate real returns differential of 
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. 
B – Second-order accurate expression for taxes in Section 5.1.2 
Rearranging the government budget constraint for taxes under the assumption of constant government 
spending and constant government debt, we have  
 )1()1)1(( 1  
m
t
n
t
f
tt rbrvvrgT                              (B1) 
where the fact that mt = δ has been used. 
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 Note that cross-product and quadratic terms are independent of inflation risk because Schmitt-Grohé and 
Uribe (2004) show that the coefficients on terms linear and quadratic in the state vector in a second-order 
expansion are independent of the volatility of exogenous shocks. 
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Taking a second-order Taylor expansion of this equation gives 
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Using our second-order accurate solution for Rˆ in the main text, we can further say that28 
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Here, as above, t.i.i.r. denotes ‘terms independent of inflation risk’. 
Using (B3a) and (B3b), the expression in (B2) can be written in the form 
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Notice that the only endogenous variable on the RHS of (B4) is the lagged risk-free rate. Using the 
solution in the main text, the risk-free rate is given by 
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where ak ≡ k/cY, aw ≡ w/cY,  aT ≡ T/cY , ))(2/(
2
,
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 unomAekPS  is the precautionary savings 
effect, θk and θb are as in the main text, and the fact that tMttE   ]
ˆ[ 1 has been used. 
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 Again, cross-product and quadratic terms are independent of inflation risk because Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe 
(2004) show that the coefficients on terms linear and quadratic in the state vector in a second-order expansion 
are independent of the volatility of exogenous shocks.  
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Substituting for the nominal rate using the second-order accurate solution in the main text gives 
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We can solve for capital using a second-order approximation of the investment Euler equation: 
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where
2
,)]2/1([ AekJIEQP    is the equity premium minus the Jensen’s inequality correction. 
Solving this equation for capital and substituting the result into (B6) gives
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The only variable left to eliminate in (B8) is taxes, which to first-order are given by
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where O[1] denotes terms of order higher than 1.  
 
Substituting for (B9) in (B8) and solving for the risk-free rate, we have:
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 It is enough to approximate taxes to first-order because, as noted by Hördahl et al. (2008), first-order accurate 
solutions are sufficient to obtain second-order accurate solutions for asset prices. 
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where ))1((1 bkk a   and 2/
2
,
22
  unomPS   is the part of precautionary 
savings effect due to inflation risk. 
Since (B10) is recursive in the risk-free rate, we can simplify further. Assuming that the initial period 
is period 0, we have the following expression: 
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where  ])1([ Twrf aa 


   is the coefficient on the lagged risk-free real rate in (B10). 
Notice that if φ > 0, the inflation risk premium will tend to raise the risk-free rate, while additional 
precautionary saving driven by inflation risk will tend to lower it. The overall effect of inflation risk 
on the risk-free real interest rate is therefore ambiguous and will depend upon which effect dominates. 
Consequently, the impact of inflation risk on taxes will generally also be ambiguous.  
We can see this formally by substituting for the lagged value of (B11) in the second-order accurate 
expression for taxes in (B4) and collecting terms: 
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Notice that ϕ1,t and ϕ2,t will be positive so long as ρrf  < 1. The parameter ϕ3 is unambiguously positive. 
C – Stochastic discount factor and the inflation risk premium under Epstein-Zin preferences 
Derivation of the stochastic discount factor 
Under Epstein-Zin preferences the lifetime utility function is given by 
  




 















1
11
,1,  
1
1
 OttYt
EZ
t cEcU                 (C1) 
The stochastic discount factor is defined by 
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The partial derivatives of the utility function are as follows: 
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Dividing (C4) by (C3) gives the expression stated in Equation (27) of the main text: 
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Derivation of the inflation risk premium 
Proposition: The second-order accurate analytical solution for the inflation risk premium is the same 
with CRRA and Epstein-Zin preferences for any calibration of the coefficient of relative risk aversion. 
Proof.  
The inflation risk premium under Epstein-Zin preferences is given by 
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Hence (C7) implies that 
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where ‘hats’ denote log deviations from steady-state and O[1] terms of higher order than 1 . 
A first-order Taylor series approximation of zt gives 
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Hence, ignoring terms of higher than order 1, we have 
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It follows that 
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Hence, the inflation risk premium is the same as with CRRA preferences for any given calibration of 
the coefficient of relative risk aversion γ.     Q.E.D. 
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Appendix D – The bond supply rule in the simulated model with Epstein-Zin preferences 
As discussed in Section 5.2, the bond supply is given by a steady-state rule of the form 1 = (χ/β)sdf EZ , 
where χ > 0. In this Appendix, the constant bond supply implied by this rule is derived. 
First, note that 1 = (χ/β)sdf EZ  implies that rf = χ/β at steady-state and that 
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where (27) has been used.  
Using (2), the LHS of (D1) is equal to 
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where the fact that r
f
 = r
n
 at steady-state has been used. 
And using (3), the RHS is given by 
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where the fact that mrbrgT mf )1()1(   has been used. 
Substituting (D2) and (D3) into (D1) and rearranging for b we have the implied bond supply:  
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Appendix E – Deterministic steady-state of the simulated model with Epstein-Zin preferences 
The deterministic steady-state is given by 
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